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Abstract
Through the global market for maritime labour, multi-national crews now work on fishing vessels which were once serviced by
domestic crews only. The remuneration and working conditions for non-domestic crews are causing concern, with allegations of
unequal and poor pay levelled at the industry. This paper presents evidence from Scotland, a nation where a significant proportion of
crews on fishing vessels originate from outside of the UK, a large number of whom come from outside the European Economic
Area. Their level of remuneration is significantly lower than their Scottish counterparts, even when employed on the same boats to
carry out the same work. The question arises whether the remuneration and inferred pay differences are justifiable economic
consequences of local and global labour markets, or whether they constitute a failure of maritime governing institutions to prevent
unjust pay discrimination. After exploring the economic and ethical arguments for keeping or removing remuneration differentials,
the paper concludes that ‘equal share’ is the most just distributional criterion for international fishers’ remuneration. Although we
recognise that other distributive justice principles will continue to be defended on economic grounds, the paper argues that policy
makers need to find ways of redressing the power imbalances between employers and employees that contribute to unequal pay.
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Introduction
Over the last 30 years, international economic integration has led
to a global market for maritime labour, including fishing labour
(Winchester and Bailey 2012; Glen 2008; Sampson 2003).
Increasingly seen as a ‘globalized sector of the world economy’
(Winchester and Bailey 2012: p. 713), employment aboard ves-
sels has been described as ‘a truly global, multi-national and
multi-cultural occupation’ (Glen 2008: p. 845). However, whilst
there is a wide variety of regulatory frameworks governing sea-
farers’ work at sea,1 for seafarers on fishing vessels, there are
gaps in the policies and laws because of perceived diffi-
culties of implementing regulations in the fishing sector
that ensure transparent, fair and ethical practice on rates of
remuneration and working conditions (ILO 2013, 2015b).
Unionisation, coordinated through the International
Transport Federation (ITF), has been instrumental in
progressing labour standards and treaties in the wider
maritime sector, culminating in strike action if not com-
plied with (DeSombre 2008; Lillie 2013), but the
fragmented nature of marine fishing has hindered similar
progress in this sector (ILO 2013). This lacuna represents
an inadequate response to the pace of change in the fish-
ing industry, brought about by globalisation and interna-
tional labour mobility. Evidence of pay discrimination,
poor working conditions and, in some cases, human rights
abuses of fishers2 in developed as well as developing
world fisheries, demonstrates a need to critically examine
regulatory regimes and processes related to fishing labour
2 Evidence of pay discrimination includes low wages, delays in payments to
families and inflated charges imposed by labour agencies. These reports also
detail harsh working conditions such as excessive working hours; sleep dep-
rivation; inadequate accommodation; poor medical treatment; poor hygiene;
insufficient food; a lack of social amenities; and in a number of cases human
rights abuses including beatings; intimidation; confinement and isolation; ra-
cial prejudice; and abandonment.
1 For example, the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Labour Convention) (Minimum
Requirements for Seafarers etc.) Regulations 2014; the InternationalConvention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Fishing Vessel
Personnel (STCW-F) 1995; the FAO Code of Conduct for responsible Fisheries
1995; and the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), 2001.
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(ILO 2015a, b; Bloor et al. 2000; Couper et al. 2015; ILO
2013; Lobrigo and Pawlik 2015; Simmons and Stringer
2014).
Following media reports claiming human rights abuses,
migrant trafficking and forced labour aboard fishing vessels
(Lawrence et al. 2015; Urbina 2015; The Associated Press
2015), justice claims are being made to highlight the exploi-
tation of crews. Poor pay and human rights violations are a
growing concern for the seafood industry and governments,
who publically promote sustainable management and increas-
ingly ethically sourced fish. The Scottish fishing industry has
not been immune to such reports (ITF 2008; Kelbie 2008;
Shebbeare 2015; Couper et al. 2015), and there are several
on-going investigations into potential abuses (Peachey 2014;
Leask 2015), including issues around the pay of international3
fishers working on board Scottish vessels. Scotland has one of
the largest sea areas in Europe and lands 38% of the European
Union’s (EU) total allowable catch (TAC) of six key stocks,4
making it one of Europe’s largest fishing nations (Marine
Scotland 2015). To crew this industry, Scotland’s fishing busi-
nesses are becoming increasingly dependent on the global
maritime labour market, with 28% of the fishing workforce
originating from outside the UK, and 71% of those were from
outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (Marine
Scotland Science 2016). The shift from UK and EEA crews
to non-EEAworkers has evolved over the last 14 years, with
the majority now being employed on North Sea fishing ves-
sels (Marine Scotland Science 2016).
Globally, the main countries supplying international mari-
time workers are China, Russia and the Philippines (BIMCO
and ICS 2015), the latter accounting for the largest share—
almost 30% of international seafarers (Sampson and
Schroeder 2006). Mechanisms to recruit non-EEA crews are
well developed and facilitated through international employ-
ment agencies, who, in most cases, employ the crewmembers
on behalf of the vessel normally on contractual conditions and
rates of pay associated with the country of origin rather than
the area where they are working5. This context frames the
main question addressed in this paper, how might we define
what is just and fair pay for a multi-national workforce oper-
ating in a transnational space?
The paper begins by setting out the legal-political context
of the rights of international fishers. Against this backdrop, we
present and analyse data on vessel labour costs collected
through a survey conducted with skippers of Scottish vessels
in 2015. By comparing a sample of different remuneration
types for different nationalities working on Scottish fishing
vessels, the data show the difference in labour cost which
indicates significant pay differentials between UK, EEA and
non-EEA crew. Our discussion of the findings is framed using
theories of distributive justice and we consider different
claims made for keeping or removing these remuneration dif-
ferentials. The paper makes two key arguments through this
discussion. First, we argue that ‘equal share’—equal pay for
equal work—is the most just criterion for international fishers’
pay and one that employers and governing institutions should
in principle adhere to. This is particularly important since
insufficient protection of international fishers leaves them vul-
nerable to other forms of exploitation, e.g. poor safety, poor
well-being and forced labour. Second, whilst we recognise
that a ‘modified criterion’ of equality (i.e. pay should be equal
until a convincing reason for differential pay is given) will
continue to be defended by some on economic grounds, we
advocate policy makers and industry, including recruitment
agencies, to work domestically and transnationally to address
resulting inequalities and develop a transnational system of
fair wages.
Legal-Political Context: the Current Rights
of International Fishers
Seafarers typically work in what Sampson (2003) refers to as
de-territorialised and deregulated ‘multi-ethnic hyperspaces’,
which means that the task of ensuring that workers’ rights are
recognised and enforced is challenging. Whilst an internation-
al seafaring labour market has been welcomed by many ma-
rine industries, globalising processes which have stimulated
the search for cheap labour abroad have, it has been argued,
led to unethical practices that sustain poverty and insecurity
for seafarers (Alderton and Winchester 2002). International
seafarers are embedded in both transnational and national con-
texts; their lives straddled across multiple borders and their
well-being subject to complex and often antiquated regulatory
frameworks. As Alderton and Winchester suggest, seafarers
have little agency to contest the laws that govern them:
Seafarers literally live at the point of convergence of the
decisions and procedures emanating from the interlaced
network of national and international organisations and
institutions which define, and then attempt to enforce,
the regulatory framework of the maritime industry [yet
the seafarer is] scarcely entered into the information
3 We use the term ‘international’ to capture all workers from outside the UK
but then differentiate between EEA and non-EEA fishing crews because of
their respective visa and residents’ statuses. This distinction takes account of
the fact that non-EEA crews in most cases have no intention or prospect of
living in Scotland
4 These six key stocks are cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus
aeglefinus), monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), Nephrops (Nephrops
norvegicus), herring (Clupea harengus) and mackerel (Scomber scombrus).
5 For example, in 2011, the Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO), a fish-
ing boat owners’ producer organisation (PO) with about 300 member vessels,
advertised that they ‘can arrange [through a Filipino manning agency] the
supply of Filipino crew’ for a fee of US$1400 per month.
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networks which inform the rule-making process
(Alderton and Winchester 2002: p. 35)
Critical scholarship on the capitalist model for fisheries sees
the commodification of labour in the marine environment as
an inevitable result of market forces (Howard 2012) and the
shift towards market societies (Polanyi 1957 in Pinkerton and
Davis 2015). This rise in the commodification of labour has
shifted what some argue was fishing businesses operating as
‘crews or teams’ (St Martin 2007) towards a business model
where labour has to compete across borders tomaximise profit
for the operator (Campling et al. 2012). Pressures to operate in
this space have strained labour relations on vessels (Menzies
2002), and social differentiations may emerge which create
new conflicts. Despite legal and regulatory frameworks to
protect the rights and entitlements of international fishers,
the reality of living and working offshore means that contra-
vention of such laws and regulations is commonplace (see
Sampson 2003; Sampson and Zhao 2003; Sampson and
Schroeder 2006; Alderton and Winchester 2002). Sampson
and Schroeder (2006), for example, highlight the differential
access to rights and entitlements in terms of health care, legal
aid and union representation that affect the material and psy-
chological well-being of multi-national crews on German ves-
sels. They argue that the cumulative effects of inequitable
working conditions, wage differentials and discrimination
lead to many international seafarers feeling marginalised and
living ‘at the edge’ of society on land (Sampson and
Schroeder 2006: p. 76).
Although international conventions offer standards, these
are not universally applicable and often do not protect the
rights of international fishers. The widely ratified United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1985
proclaims that the state with whom a vessel is registered and
whose flag it flies is responsible for ‘social matters’ on said
vessel, but UNCLOS gives no details on what constitutes
‘social matters’. Through sectoral lobbying and union pres-
sure, the international Merchant Shipping (Maritime Labour
Convention) Regulations 2006 which came into force in the
UK in August 2014 made strides in detailing working and
living conditions6 for seafarers but it excluded rates of pay
for seafarers’ labour and fishing vessels are exempt from this
convention. This latter exemption is, however, set to change
with the ratification of the ILO’s Working in Fishing
Convention (No. 188). Adopted by the European Union, this
Convention came into force in November 2017 with a stag-
gered implementation process beginning in summer 2018
(per. comms, Maritime and Coastguard Agency 2018).
ILO188 is a welcome first step towards addressing issues of
poor working and living conditions on fishing vessels.
However, whilst ILO188 clarifies remuneration processes (in-
cluding contractual conditions), it does not stipulate anything
about fair pay. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
have provided voluntary codes of conduct7 since 1995, but
these are non-binding and also do not instruct on rates of
remuneration. Moreover, as the ILO stated in 2015: ‘A num-
ber of key instruments ([at the time] not least ILO Convention
188) are not in force, and key conventions are not necessarily
ratified and domesticated by all fishing nations (flag-, coastal-,
port states). Hence, rules and regulations are not harmonised –
not even among members of the EU’ (ILO 2015b: p. 53).
The lack of harmonisation of binding legislation for the
fishing industry is often excused on grounds of the perceived
cost for a large, heterogeneous and complex industry facing
global competition (ILO 2013). Ratification of the Working in
Fishing Convention (No 188)8 once fully implemented and
operational will hopefully improve conditions. However,
there are concerns for fishing crews working in international
waters in the transition period, including those fishing in coun-
tries’ Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ) who are not always
protected by domestic legislation.
Another source of legal protection for international fishers
can be found in the conventions and laws on migration and
equality. There is no legal definition of a ‘migrant’ but there
are rules to protect the rights of those engaged in migration—
free or forced. Broadly speaking, the International Convention
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) protects
against discrimination on the basis of immigration (article
2(2)). Justice claims can be made by workers who are non-
nationals under immigration discrimination laws if they have
moved away from their home state and are employed on a visa
processed in a new national jurisdiction. However, this is com-
plicated since states can delineate the types of rights afforded
to legal immigrants and to those who have entered national
territory without permission (Aldana 2011). In the UK, cur-
rently, EEAmigrants working on fishing vessels are protected
under EU law,9 but for those from outside the EEA, complex
6 For example, on minimum age of crews; employment agreements/contracts;
payment of wages; repatriation; seafarers’ property; accommodation and pro-
visions; training; access to medical care; and ship-owners’ liability.
7 FAO Code of Conduct for responsible Fisheries 1995; FAO International
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), 2001; FAO International Guidelines for
Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries.
8 The UK as an independent member of the ILO is most likely to accede to
ILO No.188 once the UK exits the EU, so for the purposes of this paper, we
assume adoption.
9 For example, Article 18, Treaty of Maastricht 1992 gives freedom of move-
ment to all EU citizens; the European Convention on the Legal Status of
Migrant Workers gives civil and economic rights including workplace rights
to authorised and irregular migrants, enshrining standards on minimum civil,
political, social and economic rights; and protection against discrimination
irrespective of nationality is written into two anti-discrimination Directives
(2000) and a 2004 Directive granting equal treatment for social security and
public welfare (Aldana 2011). There is an expectation that a similar system
will operate after the UK exits the EU, so for the purposes of this paper, we do
not discuss potential changes.
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visa regimes shape their access to rights and cloud their status
as migrants.
Currently, in the EU, the employment of international fish-
ers or ‘non-EEA’ fishing labour is restricted within the terri-
torial waters (0–12 nautical miles (nm)) of member states. In
the UK, a work permit is required for working inside 12 nm,
whilst under section 8(1) of the Immigration Act (1971), ves-
sels working wholly10 outside UK territorial waters (i.e. out-
side 12 nm) can contract non-EEA crews using the CRM01
transit visa to a ‘named’ vessel operating from a UK port, on
condition that the vessel docks and leaves port within 7 days.
If a country has ratified Convention no. 108/no. 185,11 then
crews can undertake this transit on their Seafarers Identity
Document (SID) without any additional paperwork. But for
countries that have not ratified this Convention, and the
Philippines is one such country, international crews need to
apply to the UK Border Agency in their home country to be
granted the right to ‘join a ship’ that is transiting through UK
waters. This process facilitates the changeovers of crews on
merchant and cruise vessels operating in the international mar-
itime industry. Since the mid-2000s, this ‘join ship’ CRM01
visa and SID have been used to supply UK-based fishing
vessels with non-EEA contract crews. This extension of the
CRM01 visa and the SID to the fishing industry has raised
concerns over whether welfare and remuneration practices in
the fishing industry are at risk from a provision that was prin-
cipally designed for transnational merchant and cruise vessels
(Covile 2012).
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions have
expanded over the past 50 years to ensure rights for interna-
tional migrants. Since Convention 143 (article 9) was intro-
duced, these rights have been extended to irregular and
unauthorised immigrants, although not all countries have rat-
ified this convention. The UN Declaration of Human Rights
protects the human rights of all individuals who are non-na-
tionals, but worker’s rights (including the right to safe and
healthy working conditions, fair wages) are reserved for legal
immigrants. To address this inequity, a Committee on the
Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families (CRMWF)
was set up by the UN in 1990 to give workplace protection
to all migrants irrespective of status, including protection
against slavery and forced labour, equal remuneration condi-
tions and terms of employment, unless waived through con-
tract. Waiver through contract is an important clause since
those who have committed via contract, no matter what the
conditions of employment signed up to, appear to be no longer
protected. A Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council
on the issue of international migration was subsequently
appointed to develop a multilateral, rights-based approach to
labour migration (Aldana 2011).
These moves suggest that international regulatory frame-
works on labour rights for foreign workers can be used to
make justice claims by those working ‘at the edge’ of society.
The extent to which workers are aware of the structures and
processes involved in making a justice claim against exploi-
tation is, however, unclear. This raises the question of the
relations of dependence between employers, agents and
workers and the broader issue of power. We expand on these
matters in the ‘Discussion’ section, following an explanation
of the research methods used in this study and a presentation
of remuneration data from the Scottish fishing industry.
Methods: the Scottish Sea Fisheries
Employment Survey
Marine Scotland Science, the scientific division of Marine
Scotland, the Scottish Government’s directorate responsible
of the management of Scotland’s Sea, commissioned a sur-
vey using a semi-structured questionnaire, with skippers
working on 15% of Scotland’s marine fishing vessels (n =
222) between September and November 2015. The survey
focused on five key sectors: pot and trap vessels; demersal >
24 m, seine and pair trawl vessels; demersal < 24 m vessels;
scallop dredgers; and Nephrops trawlers. Using stratified
purposeful sampling, the survey collected data on fishing
crews’ demographics, comprising age, nationality, job skills
and the types of remuneration arrangements crew members
worked under, including payment structures. The survey
sampled 16% of crew members (n = 749) working in these
five key sectors in Scotland during this period. A random
sampling element was introduced at the harbour to select
vessels that were present at the time of the interviews, al-
though participation in the survey was purely voluntary.
The survey targeted vessel skippers for information about
the vessel and crew: where skippers were not available, ves-
sel owners were interviewed.
In this paper, descriptive analysis reports were made on
the remuneration data by nationality and contract type for all
sampled vessels (n = 211 vessels; n = 749 crew members).
Statistical analysis was undertaken on a sub-section of sam-
pled vessels which had supplied complete financial break-
downs. This analysis was conducted by position—i.e. deck-
hands (n = 360) and engineers (n = 56). The sub-section to-
talled 13% of vessels in these five sectors (n = 192) and 9%
of crews (n = 416). To test for significant differences be-
tween vessel labour costs arrangements by position, the
Mann-Whitney U tests were used as post hoc tests of the
10 Allowing for adverse weather which cannot make up more than 30% of a
vessel’s time at sea, and skippers must have records to prove the need to be in
inshore waters (pers. comm. Home Office UK).
11 C185-Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No.
185). ‘Nationals who hold a seaman’s book issued in line with ILO convention
108 (or ILO Convention 185 where the country, as a result of ratifying
ILO185, has now renounced ILO 108) do not need entry clearance to join a
ship as a contract seaman. The UK does not require a [transit] visa for holders
of a seaman’s book issued by a signatory country’ (Home Office 2014).
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Kruskal-Wallis, a non-parametric test, as the data violated
parametric assumptions. The Kruskal-Wallis tests found sig-
nificant differences between groups, but only the results
from the Mann-Whitney U tests are presented in this paper
to show a statistical difference between pairs within the
groups.
Results: Labour Cost Differentials
in the Scottish Sea Fishing Industry
Survey analysis found 94.8% of sampled British crews were
remunerated via a crew share arrangement (Table 1) whereby
they receive a ‘share’ of the value of fish landings for the
service of their labour, after deducting vessel operating costs
(e.g. fuel, quota leasing, ice and harbour dues). This remuner-
ation arrangement is linked to the performance of the vessel
and its crew and allows flexibility for crews to move if a
vessel’s skipper is underperforming. This arrangement is
based on the distributional justice principle of ‘moral desert’
which entails that ‘other things being equal, people ought to
get (or be given) what they deserve’ (Campbell 1988: p. 152).
A common metric of what people deserve is merit: you de-
serve to be paid more if you have worked harder or more
productively—you merit the extra payment. In the case of
crew share arrangements, what one deserves varies depending
on factors such as position, length of service and
responsibilities.
The remaining 5.2% of sampled British crews were remu-
nerated through contracts, of which there are two kinds: con-
tracts direct with a vessel; and contracts through a recruit-
ment (manning) agency. For both types of contracts, rates of
pay are generally set monthly for each crew member, but
under vessel contracts the remuneration for labour goes to
the individual under contract, whilst for agency contracts, the
remuneration for labour is paid to the agent who in turn pays
the crew member after deducting agency fees. Depending on
the contract, labour costs for a vessel or the ‘cost to the
vessel’ for having that crew member may include other con-
tractual expenses beyond payment for the services of labour,
such as repatriation fees, administration fees, expenses and
bonuses. Based on our figures, Howard (2012) suggests that
deductions from monthly wages could amount to around
40% of vessel labour costs per fisher on an agency contract.
This study, however, has not been able to confirm this pro-
portion directly with recruitment agencies. Remuneration
through contracts is based on the principle of ‘contractual
entitlement’ which is described as people being entitled to
the pay they have voluntarily contracted to receive. This
asserts that what people should receive is a matter of legal
right and is a consequence of their own free consent
(Campbell 1988). In the Scotland case, the vast majority of
non-EEA workers (97.3%) were paid under contract
arrangements, 82.2% through an agency and 15.1% directly.
A smaller proportion of EEA crew (27.9%) were paid under
contract arrangements and of those only 4.9% were
contracted through agencies (Table 1). The remaining EEA
crews (67.2%) and non-EEA crews (2.7%) were remunerat-
ed through the crew share system. These data suggest that
British crew members are most likely to be remunerated via
crew share; non-EEA crew members most likely via agency
contracts; and EEA crew members through a variety of ar-
rangements, but most likely crew share.
Analysis of gross monthly costs to the vessels for crew
working under different remuneration arrangements (Fig. 1)
was compared for deckhands and engineers. The Mann-
Whitney U tests found significant differences (p < 0.01) with
a medium to large effect (r = 0.4–0.6) (Cohen 1988) for both
deckhands and engineers between those on crew share and
those on either vessel or agency contracts (Table 2). There
was no significant difference between those on vessel and
agency contracts (p = 0.251). This indicates that vessels crew
costs are significantly less for crews on agency and vessel
contracts (£1250 vessel and £1201 agency per month for
deckhands, £1750 vessel and £1250 agency for engineers—
pre-contract costs and tax), respectively, compared to those on
crew share (£2310 per month for deckhands, £4000 for engi-
neers—pre-tax).
TheMann-WhitneyU tests on remuneration agreements by
fishing sector also showed significant differences (p = <
0.001) with a large effect (r > 0.5) in vessel crew costs for
crew share and contract crews in all sectors with the exception
of the < 10-m pot and trap fleet (Table 5 in the Appendix).
These differences were particularly high for demersal sectors
and over 18 m Nephrops (prawn) trawlers. Median vessel
costs by sector for individual contract crew ranged from
£1050 to £1500 per month compared to a range from £2525
to £5600 for fishers on crew share (Table 5 in the Appendix).
This analysis provides evidence that vessel costs are signifi-
cantly lower for crew on vessel and agency contracts, mostly
non-EEA crews (Table 1), when compared to their counter-
parts on crew share who undertake the same roles (Table 2) in
the same sectors (Table 5 in the Appendix). From this, it can
be inferred there are significant differences in pay between
fishers on crew share arrangements and their counterparts on
contract pay arrangements, especially agency contracts given
a portion of cost to the vessel making up manning agency’s
recruitment fees.
How these inferred remuneration differentials between in-
ternational fishers (non-EEA), UK and EEA fishers are shap-
ing the industry and how they are justified will now be
discussed. This discussion is divided into two sections: (1)
arguments used to maintain remuneration differentials be-
tween international (non-EEA), UK and EEA workers and




Arguments for Maintaining Remuneration
Differentials
Central to any argument over pay remuneration is the concept
of justice. When conflicts arise in a society, principles of jus-
tice help determine what a society accepts as reasonable and
fair. Campbell (1988) defines five criteria of justice that we
can apply to the issue: moral desert; contractual entitlement
(both referred to in the results section); equal shares; satisfac-
tion of need/welfare; andmaximising utility/efficiency. One of
the most compelling and publicised criterion of justice for the
payment for labour is an ‘equal share’. This entails that a
worker ought to receive the same amount of pay as anyone
else doing the same job. This criterion is founded on the intu-
itively appealing nostrums of equal pay for equal work and
treating like cases alike (Campbell 1988). In the UK, the
Equality Act (EA) 2010 enshrines the equality criterion: B…
‘equal work’, [meaning] work by one employee that is the
same or broadly similar… it is the nature of the work that is
important, rather than the job title or job description… [and]
‘work of equal value’ [meaning] the work one employee
does… is assessed as of ‘equal value’ in terms of the demands
placed on the two employees. … they can be regarded as of
equal worth when looking at the training and skills necessary
to do each job, the working conditions or the decision-making
required^ (ACAS 2015: p. 26).
However, the main difficulty with the principle of equal
share is that no two cases are ever the same, and any criterion
of justice which denies this fact of life is bound to be uncon-
vincing (Campbell 1988). To overcome this difficulty, this cri-
terion has often been modified to allow some flexibility. For
example, there are Blimited circumstances where an employer
may act in a way which is discriminatory, but where it can
objectively justify discrimination as ‘a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim’^ (ACAS 2015: p. 20). In these
cases, the onus is placed on the employer to defend any inequal-
ity of pay for workers performing the same job. If we apply this
modification to the criterion of equal share—that there should
be equal pay unless differentials can be objectively justified—
there are four arguments that could be advanced for the remu-
neration differential observed in Scottish fishing vessels: rela-
tive differences in the cost of living; economic risk-sharing;
labour abundance; and productivity. On the first argument, be-
cause of differences in countries’ cost of living, it is important to
recognise that the purchasing power of a given amount of mon-
ey differs when comparing the pay of workers who live in
different countries. In other words, the same basket of goods
and services costs different amounts in different countries even
after adjusting for nominal exchange rates.12 Based on the jus-
tice principle of ‘satisfaction of need or welfare’, this justice
criterion entails that people be paid whatever they need to keep
themselves and their families fed, clothed and housed. As
Campbell (1988: pp. 85–86) points out, ‘Justice has inescapable
and firm ties to the treatment accorded to those who fare worse
in whatever social arrangements exist in a society… any theory
of justice must, therefore, have regard to its implications for the
most needy persons within a community’. In the case of inter-
national fishers on Scottish vessels, where their working status
do not grant them permission to reside and spend in the UK,
their financial needs would generally be lower than their coun-
terparts residing in Scotland.
When the Scottish data on costs to vessels for hiring differ-
ent migrant crews are adjusted to reflect purchasing power,
statistical analysis found no significant differences in median
pay between the crew under different contracts working in the
same position (Table 3). The exception is for deckhands under
crew share and those on agency contracts, where the welfare
impact of vessels’ labour costs was significantly greater for
agency contract crews (Md cost to vessels is £2316 for agency
fishers compared to £1850 for crew share fishers). So, if it is
assumed that international fishers spend their money in their
country of origin, there is no difference in the welfare impacts
of vessel costs: there is purchasing power parity between them
and Scottish crew.
However, this analysis needs to adjust for the share of
agency contract pay that would be taken up by agency fees,
which in some instances could generate significant differ-
ences. Given a lack of reliable data on agency fees, we are
12 World Bank International Comparison Programme.
Table 1 Remuneration arrangements on Scottish vessels, broken down
by British, EEA (Latvian, Romanian, Lithuanian, Polish, Irish and
Spanish) and non-EEA crews (dominated by Filipinos, but increasing
Ghanaians, Sri Lankans and Belarusians). Reproduced with permission
from Marine Scotland ©Crown copyright 2016
British EEA Non-EEA
n = 749 542 61 146
Agency contracts 0% 4.9% 82.2%
Vessel contract 5.2% 23% 15.1%
Mixture of crew share and vessel contract 0% 4.9% 0%
Crew share 94.8% 67.2% 2.7%
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unable to make these adjustments and identify this need as an
area for further research. A further theoretical difficulty with
this approach is that it pays people according to their needs
rather than their contributions. On this basis, a person with
many children could be paid more than a childless person,
irrespective of his/her work output. Moreover, with this crite-
rion of justice, how do we fairly measure what people need?
As Campbell (1988: p. 195) points out, ‘the concept of need
is… so open-ended that it admits of almost any practical de-
ployment…’ and what can be considered a want in one place
could be classified as a need in another. So whilst this princi-
ple is widely supported and applied when making pay com-
parisons (World Bank International Comparison Programme),
it remains problematic especially in transnational/trans-
boundary spaces such as the marine environment. For exam-
ple, country of origin may not be a reliable comparator since
international fishers may have different financial responsibil-
ities in a range of locations. Currently, there is limited under-
standing about international fishers’ financial demands and
living expenses, which are likely to be compounded by ex-
penses associated with living away from home and additional
burden to families because of the absent member and inciden-
tal expenses. Further research is required to understand such
pressures on international fishers especially to increase trans-
parency on costs to workers for accessing maritime
employment.
The second modified equality argument for keeping pay
differentials is economic risk-sharing. This takes into account
that profit sharing or crew share workers are exposed to great-
er economic risks than contract workers. For example, if a
fishing vessel lands no fish, workers on crew share get noth-
ing, whilst their counterparts on contract would receive their
full pay. The risk-sharing characteristic of these arrangements
explains why they are predominantly used in natural resource-
based sectors like fishing and farming where the value of
production is vulnerable to a wide range of external shocks.
An argument could therefore be made that workers on crew
share arrangements should be rewarded more for the services
of their labour as a premium to compensate them for sharing
risks with the vessel owner (Weitzman and Kruse 1990). This
is linked to the principle of ‘moral desert’ where if someone
takes more risk they deserve more reward.
Table 2 The Mann-Whitney U test of differences between the monthly
‘costs to the vessels’ for those on crew share compared to those on vessel
contracts and those on agency contracts. Md shows the median gross
monthly cost in £. p value demonstrated the significance ** p < 0.01
and r shows the effect—0.1 low effect, 0.3 median effect and 0.5 high
effect (Cohen 1988). Analysed with permission from Marine Scotland
Positions and remuneration arrangement N Md (£) U z p r
Deckhand Crew share 206 2310
Vessel contract 54 1250 2549 − 6.126 0.001** 0.4
Crew share 206 2310
Agency contract 100 1201 3774 − 8.993 0.001** 0.5
Vessel contract 54 1250
Agency contract 100 1201 2398 − 1.148 0.251 0.9
Engineer Crew share 41 4000
Vessel contract 6 1750 31.5 − 2.918 0.002** 0.4
Crew share 41 4000
Agency contract 9 1250 16.5 − 4.244 0.001** 0.6
Vessel contract 6 1750
Agency contract 9 1250 14 − 1.532 0.145 0.4
Fig. 1 Median gross monthly cost
to vessel for crew members on
different remuneration
arrangements but undertaking the
same role as either deckhands or
engineers
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Whilst the risk argument appears convincing, a key ques-
tion here is does the risk deserve the reward? As Sterba (1974:
p. 1) suggests, ‘while everyone agrees that justice, almost by
definition, is giving people what they deserve, there appears to
be little agreement concerning what it is that people deserve’.
In this case, all crews’ members are exposed to the same
substantial risk of working at sea in dangerous conditions
and those on deck often more so. In practice, the potential
economic risks of low catches and therefore low wages are
minimal compared to the actual daily risk of operations, espe-
cially given the fact that vessels are unlikely to operate for
long if fish cannot be found.
The third modified equality argument for keeping pay dif-
ferentials between crew share and contract crews is the abun-
dance of labour in markets supplying the Scottish fishing in-
dustry. The price paid for labour tends to be low in countries
where labour is more abundant and wages reflect rates of pay
in the said country. For example, Freeman and Oostendorp
(2000), using the OccupationalWages Around theWorld data,
found that ‘[w]ages in the same occupation vary greatly across
countries measured by common currency exchange and mea-
sured by purchasing power parity’. A good proxy for
assessing the abundance of labour in a country is the national
minimum wage, since it indicates the extent to which society
is willing to ration employment relative to the size of its labour
supply.13 Data from the ILO (Table 4) show that the minimum
wage set for the UK labour market is significantly higher than
that set in all the countries supplying crew to the Scottish
fishing industry. Filipino and Indonesian crews receive
11.5% and 7%, respectively, of the UK national minimum
wage in their home country, whilst Ghanaians and Sri
Lankans receive 3% of the UK national minimum wage in
their home countries.
This argument is based on the principle of ‘contractual
entitlement’, given that the majority of fishers appear willing
to sign contracts for less remuneration than the UK minimum
wage, but for significantly higher remuneration than their
home country minimum wage. However, the difficulty with
this argument is that individuals might be willing to sign con-
tracts that pay them much less than others, due to desperation,
misinformation or misunderstanding. Without oversight, con-
tractual entitlement lacks transparency over what is being
signed or consented to. As Campbell (1988: p. 121) notes,
such contracts raise questions ‘about the involuntariness of
the exchanges through duress, ignorance or mistake’ as well
as concern that labour rights enshrined in different treaties
may inadvertently be waived through contract. How non-
coercive power plays into ‘contractual entitlement’ is an im-
portant explanatory variable. Further research is required to
understand how relations of dependency and power influences
justices claims and how current structures around accessing
international labour impact on peoples ‘free’ choice.
The fourth modified equality argument for keeping pay
differentials is linked to the distributive justice claim of ‘util-
ity-maximisation and efficiency’. This entails that people be
paid according to their economic value to their employer. The
rationale behind this criterion is that if differential pay is nec-
essary in order to maximise total utility, then people who are
valued as contributing more to that utility should be paid more
(Campbell 1988). The standard economic argument here is
that workers receiving a fixed wage have less incentive to
work hard than workers in profit-share employment, because
for the latter, the less they work the less they earn (Kruse
1992). This argument concludes that in the case of the fishing
industry, workers on crew share are perceived to be more
productive and efficient than their counterparts on wage or
fixed pay arrangements (Weitzman and Kruse 1990) and
should be paid more as a result.
However, the difficultly with this approach is that it awards
pay to people on the basis of a criterion (productivity) that
may have little to do with them (and their performance) and
all to do with external circumstances beyond their control.
More widely, utility-maximisation seems to justify injustice,
since it is ‘compatible with the many gross inequalities which
are routinely denounced as unjust’ (Campbell 1988: p. 129). It
turns workers into commodities, ignoring the fact that people
have different motivations to work hard beyond money, and
Bpermits the ‘victimisation’ of minorities whose sufferings
can be outweighed by the increased pleasures [or benefits]
these sufferings bring to others^ (Campbell 1988: pp. 129,
141). In addition, qualitative data from the 2013 Scottish
Sea Fisheries Employment report (Marine Scotland Science
2014) contradict the argument. Interviews with skippers re-
ported international fishers as reliable and hard-working, ex-
pressing that ‘local crews are not reliable, foreign crews are’,
‘foreigners work all day’; ‘Filipinos are amazing workers’ and
‘All foreign crew. Very reliable – sober, drug free and willing
to do whatever is asked’ (2014, pp. 33–42).
Arguments for Removing Remuneration Differentials
There are five arguments for removing remuneration differen-
tials. These are (1) international fishers’ dissatisfaction at
wage differentials; (2) the role and practices of international
employment agencies; (3) public pressure to reduce differen-
tials; (4) advocacy of living wage policies; and (5) national
versus global justice. The first argument for reducing wage
differentials is that differentials can cause considerable dissat-
isfaction and unhappiness to international fishers. As Couper
et al. (1999: p. 47) argues in relation to the internationals
shipping and fishing industry ‘complaints are received regu-
larly from seafarers who are receiving less pay than others on
board their ship by virtue of their race’. This argument rests on
13 Other factors being equal, a national minimumwage that is set too high will
restrict the number of people in employment.
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the premise that ships and vessels are social spaces within
which social and cultural orderings of class, race and gender
operate (see Pearson 2009; Peters 2010; Steinberg 1999;
Worden 2009). Differential pay within a work place affects
the material and psychological well-being of crews and may
heighten the risks of further exploitation, discrimination and
marginalisation due to uneven relationships of power on board
(Sampson 2003; Sampson and Zhao 2003; Sampson and
Schroeder 2006; and Alderton and Winchester 2002). The
negative impact of differential pay on levels of worker satis-
faction and happiness is a strong justification for removing
wage differentials and imposing the principle of equal shares.
The second argument for reducing remuneration differen-
tials relates to the role of international labour recruitment
agencies. Agencies appear to base seafarers’ market value
on what they are willing to work for, reflecting the supply
country’s unemployment rate, rather than what businesses
are willing to pay, reflecting the demand country’s unemploy-
ment rate. This situation, which is known as monopsony pow-
er, does not allow for an accurate reading of the true value of
labour in the global market because workers from countries
with higher levels of unemployment generally lack the power
to bargain for higher pay. Unions have been credited with
negotiating higher rates of remuneration for seafarers from
some countries. For example, Ruggunan (2011: p. 78) argues
that unionisation has led to pay and conditions for Filipino
seafarers on merchant vessels remaining fairly high, yet
Filipinos are paid less than the ITF rate and South Africans
are paid the ITF rate because ‘national unions… are able to
negotiate their wage rates to make their members more attrac-
tive to prospective employers’ (Ruggunan 2011: p. 93). So
whilst unionisation might reduce the pay differential for some
nationals working in the fishing industry, it may not do so for
others, whose unions are not as effective in lobbying their
cause. In some cases, there are also examples where interna-
tional fishers have taken financial risks and become indebted
to recruitment agents, known as debt bondage, where they
have had to raise capital to access overseas work in the first
place (Couper et al. 2015). This is classed as an abuse of
human rights and a form of modern slavery (United Nations
Human Rights Commission 2016).
The third argument for reducing wage differentials is that
public pressure is increasing to do so. In addition to industrial
influence, the ‘public’ can and are increasingly exerting their
influence in matters of employment and human rights and
what is viewed as reasonable and fair. Increasingly, it is stated
that consumers expect seafood to be sustainably sourced
(MSC 2016), and more recently, this expectation has begun
to include what society perceives as morally acceptable labour
practices. Social and ethical issues on the sustainability agen-
da have lagged behind environmental issues (Kittinger et al.
2017), but during the past few years, there has been a flurry of
supply chain activities launched, some of which focus on
preventing cases of worker abuse (Plant 2015). For example,
seafood suppliers and major retailers in the USA and UK have
begun to take action to reduce the risk of forced labour in their
supply chains, following several high-profile cases on board
fishing vessels in Thailand (Hodal and Kelly 2014). This has
intensified public scrutiny on many fishing nations (Couper
et al. 2015). Negative media exposure has raised consumer
consciousness, putting pressure on the supply chain to share
intelligence and coordinate communications to ensure a col-
lective voice is heard by countries where labour abuses and
exploitative pay are found (Plant 2015). In the UK, under the
Modern-day Slavery Act (2015) and in Scotland under the
Trafficking and Exploitation Act (2015), businesses with a
net turnover over £36 million are mandated to ensure their
supply chains are free from labour abuse. This is a reason
Table 3 TheMann-WhitneyU tests of differences between the monthly
‘costs to the vessels’ for crew adjusted to take into account purchasing
power parity (PPP). Md shows the median gross monthly cost in £. p
value demonstrated the significance ** p < 0.01 and r shows the ef-
fect—0.1 low effect, 0.3 median effect and 0.5 high effect (Cohen
1988). Analysed with permission from Marine Scotland
Positions and remuneration agreement N Md (£) U z p r
Deckhand Crew share 206 1850
Contract 54 2038 5304 − 0.526 0.599 0.3
Crew share 206 1850
Agency 100 2316 7946 − 3.243 0.001** 0.2
Contract 54 2038
Agency 100 2316 2089 − 2.315 0.021 0.2
Engineer Crew share 41 2929
Contract 6 2687 111 − 0.383 0.721 0.6
Crew share 41 2929
Agency 9 2454 137 − 1.200 0.240 0.2
Contract 6 2687
Agency 9 2454 19 − 0.943 0.388 0.2
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for arguing that it is in the economic self-interest of fishing
companies to reduce wage differentials in order to ensure they
comply with exploitation legislation and thereby avoid losing
the respect and trust of their customers. However, it is also
worth noting that some commentators argue that price is still
the over-riding factor determining consumers’ buying deci-
sions (Seafish 2015), and there is a discrepancy between what
consumers say and what they will do, to put pressure on sup-
pliers. So how influential this movement will be in reducing
inequality in the fishing industry is far from clear.
The fourth argument for reducing wage differentials in this
case study relates to the shift from the minimum wage to the
living wage, which is central to the Scottish Government’s
employment policy. This argument, which invokes the con-
tractual entitlement criterion of justice to counteract a modifi-
cation of the equality criterion, points out that the Scottish
Government advocates not only the national minimum wage,
but also the national living wage to tackle issues of low pay
and inequality (Living Wage Accreditations 2016). The living
wage is justified because low pay is one of the three main
drivers of in-work poverty, and there is evidence to suggest
that the benefits of the living wage are not only to employees
but also to employers through increased productivity, reduced
absenteeism and improved staff morale (Scottish Government
2016). Although legally, international fishers live and work
outside UK territorial waters, it is difficult to argue that non-
EEA crews on contracts to Scottish vessels do not contribute
significantly to Scottish businesses and the Scottish economy
(Curtis 2016), which is a key criterion used by Her Majesty
Revenues and Custom (HMRC) for imposing taxation regu-
lations. If international fishers can be classified in this way for
taxation, they should equally qualify for the range of contrac-
tual arrangements offered to UK and EEA fishers which
would be governed by minimal wage standards and potential-
ly the living wage.
The fifth argument for reducing wage differentials follows
on from the fourth, asserting that whilst national justice often
trumps global justice in its application, domestic principles of
fairness and equality should be promoted and supported not
just nationally but across transnational boundaries to promote
more universal standards. Attempting to influence universal
justice claims is not without its difficulties given justice claims
vary so much across the world, but in cases where workers are
living and working across national borders, domestic expec-
tations of fairness should invoke international or transnational
protections. Forced labour is a comparatively well-defined
issue that countries and the international community may be
able to deal with through international law. However, fair la-
bour is much less well defined and globally more challenging
to audit (Aldana 2011). This variation of national norms on
migrant labour conditions complicates but should not deter
attempts to evaluate the fairness of any particular case, such
as the case in Scotland. The argument here is that Scotland
should not adopt the standards of Asia or Europe, but should
try to influence international frameworks for fair labour with
the labour standards that it affords to Scottish citizens. Given
the challenges in monitoring, reviewing and resolving inter-
national variations in remuneration, Scotland’s national poli-
cies on pay and working conditions should be given priority in
the first instance, and steps should be taken to work with other
governments to bring about an integrated framework for equal
payment for international seafarers.
Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence of differences in vessel
costs for contract and crew share fishers from which we infer
remuneration differentials in the Scottish fishing fleet. We
have used a framework of distributive justice to consider the
case for and against maintaining such differentials. From this
analysis, we argue that the criterion of equal share which en-
titles international fishers to equal pay is the most just out-
come. Whilst we recognise that differentials may be justified
on appeal to other principles of distributive justice, we recom-
mend a review of the international crews’ remuneration for
four interconnected reasons:
1) Well-being and inclusion: there is potential for increased
dissatisfaction and well-being among fishers and the as-
sociated risks of discrimination and marginalisation if un-
equal pay continues to be justified. A key assumption here
is, when out on deck, the real-time risks to crews are
shared equally and therefore also should the rewards.
2) Role of intermediaries: there is a lack of transparency in
the activities of recruitment agencies that obscures the
true value of crew labour, and a lack of research into the
financial impacts of unequal pay for contracted interna-
tional fishers working across national borders.
3) Public ethics: there is increased public awareness and
pressure for ethical fisheries practices requiring em-
ployers to take action against exploitation and other un-
just practices.
Table 4 National minimum wage of non-EEA countries (ILOSTATS
2016) supplying fishing crew to the Scottish industry (Marine Scotland
Science 2014, 2016)
Countries Hourly min. wage (£) Percentage of UK hourly min. wage
Philippines 1.07 11.5





4) Contribution: international fishers contribute to econo-
mies and societies that host their fleets, and their pay
should reflect the values and norms in those societies.
We recommend that policy makers and governing institu-
tions address pay inequalities in maritime fishing both do-
mestically and internationally. At the moment, this responsi-
bility rests on employers, but we do not believe employers
should be left to carry the responsibility on their own: they
need to be supported by national and international interven-
tion in the labour market to protect workers’ putative rights
to equal and fair pay. Recruitment agencies also need to be
held accountable to a code of ethics, certification and audits.
There is potential for further research to explore the role of
new institutions to monitor and support international
workers, such as an international ombudsman, which em-
powers workers to hold their employers to account. The lack
of binding legislation to protect fishers working in transna-
tional spaces is currently receiving some attention through
the ratification of ILO Working in Fishing Convention
no.188. The governance and regulation of the maritime fish-
ing labour market will require a rethink in light of this
Convention. In the meantime, as has been clearly defined
in UNCLOS since 1982, it is the duty of national govern-
ments to protect workers, in and, we argue, beyond the
boundaries of their jurisdictions.
Whilst these recommendations are based to some extent on
an abstract notion of justice, we also recognise and have
drawn attention to the complex relations of dependency
through which power operates. In doing so, we contribute to
a broader research agenda on the ethics, practices and impacts
of international labour migration and employment justice on
fishing vessels. It is clear that international fishers live and
work in a distinctly relational space, connected to multiple
power-laden contexts that stretch across national borders and
involve both land and seascapes (Spence 2014). Further re-
search is required to identify more clearly remuneration dif-
ferentials, recruitment practices and the role of employers and
employment agencies in shaping ethical practices in interna-
tional labour markets and the perspectives of international
fishers themselves about what constitutes fair pay.
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Appendix
Table 5 The Mann-Whitney U test of differences between monthly
costs for those on crew share compared to those on contract (due to no
significant different, agency and vessel contract were combined) (n =
411).Md shows themedian gross monthly cost in £. p value demonstrated
the significance **p = < 0.01—highly significant, and r shows the effect,
0.1 low effect, 0.3 median effect and 0.5 high effect (Cohen 1988).
Analysed with permission from Marine Scotland
Sectors n Md (£) U z p r
Demersal > 24 m, seine and pair trawl—crew share 62 5280
Demersal > 24 m, seine and pair trawl—contract 37 1300 0.000 − 8.300 0.001** 0.83
Demersal < 24 m—crew share 21 5600
Demersal < 24 m—contract 42 1050 0.000 − 6.445 0.001** 0.81
Nephrops trawl < 18 m—crew share 67 2525
Nephrops trawl < 18 m—contract 15 1100 40.000 − 5.551 0.001** 0.61
Nephrops trawl > 18 m—crew share 12 3693
Nephrops trawl > 18 m—contract 50 1250 70.000 − 4.115 0.001** 0.52
Pots and trap vessels < 10 m—crew share 35 1375
Pots and trap vessel < 10 m—contract 5 1200 78.500 − .371 0.721 /
Pots and trap vessels > 10 m—crew share 23 2813
Pots and trap vessel > 10 m—contract 5 1500 19.000 − 2.324 0.019** 0.44
Scallop dredge—crew share 21 2997
Scallop dredge—contract 42 1175 0.000 − 3.935 0.001** 0.80
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